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Abstract We present a model of the IEEE 1394 Root
Contention Protocol with a proof of Safety. This model
has real-time properties which are expressed in the lan-
guage of the event B method: first-order classical logic
and set theory. Verification is done by proof using the
event B method and its prover, we also have a way to
model-check models. Refinement is used to describe the
studied system at different levels of abstraction: first
without time to fix the scheduling of events abstracly,
and then with more and more time constraints.
Keywords Formal method · Real-time · Event-B
method · Theorem proving
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a model of the IEEE 1394
Root Contention Protocol with a proof of safety and of
real-time properties. We already described the pattern
of our model of time, applied in a simple case study, in
[8] as a pattern of refinement for the event B method.
We show here how this pattern works over a proven
development of the IEEE case study. Many different
models for real-time already exist. Our goal is to find a
model of time adapted to allow proof by invariant with
refinement over systems of events. We also argue that
is better to start a proven development by an abstract
model without time and to use refinement to add real-
time properties. Therefore our model of time must allow
us to use refinement.
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The IEEE 1394, also known as FireWire, is used to
connect devices like external hard-disks or movie cam-
eras. Devices are able to configure themselves by the
IEEE 1394 leader election protocol. This protocol takes
the network as an acyclic graph and orients edges to ob-
tain a spanning tree rooted by a leader. This scenario
has already been modelled with the event B method in
[4]. This work extends this result to the following case:
at the end of the algorithm, or when only two devices
are connected, the general algorithm can fail. In this
case the signals can cross in the bi-directional channel
between the two devices if they send signals at almost
the same send time. It is possible because there are sep-
arate cables in both directions. Consequently the IEEE
1394 Root Contention Protocol takes place in order
to choose a leader between the two devices. The algo-
rithm is probabilistic and uses a random choice between
a short and a long waiting time. This sleeping time
and signal sending between devices leads to a (proba-
ble) election. We do not take into account probabilistic
properties (we replace them by non-determinism) nor
the loss of signals. To model this system we need to
quantify the two different sleeping times and the pro-
gression of signals over the channels. We want to prove
safety properties on this algorithm. And we want to be
compatible with the existing B model ([4]) as we want
to keep the possibility to use the refinement relation
between models. Furthermore, we want to use the lan-
guage and tools of B without modifications.
The language of the B method is based on the first
order classical logic with set theory. This method can be
used for specifying, designing and coding software sys-
tems. B models of system are accompanied by math-
ematical proofs. Proofs validate an invariant over the
events of the system and validate the refinement re-
lation between models. The goal of the refinement is
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to connect an abstract specification to a more concrete
model. And step by step we can reach a precise model of
the implementation. Of course, in this paper, every for-
mal descriptions are followed by textual explanations.
The language of the B method does not contain spe-
cific real-time or distributed features but we can model
them. The idea is to guard events with a time con-
straint like a timeout or an alarm. We say that events
are linked to an “activation time” (AT). We have sev-
eral sets of AT, one for each constrained timed event
which corresponds to encoding a multiset of ATs.
To represent the real-time progression we use a glo-
bal clock represented by the variable time. Our time is
discrete so time ∈ N, but we can use unknown constants
or logical expressions between different times. The time
progression is expressed by an event called tick. No
events except tick make the time progress therefore sev-
eral events can trigger in the same clock granule. This
event nondeterministicly increases the variable time be-
tween time+1 and the first activation time (if any). So
we have in invariant: (at 6= ∅⇒ time ≤ min(at)) where
the variable at is the union of all different AT sets. As
time is a natural number we are sure that the system
will reach the next active time if tick is activated of-
ten enough. Finally, when time reaches an AT value
we have time ∈ at; in other words, time = min(at).
Therefore the event linked to this AT can trigger, do
its work and remove the reached AT from its AT set.
After this suppression, time is free to reach the next
AT, or simply increase if at = ∅.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we
introduce the Event-B method; and in section 3 a real-
time model for Event-B. In section 4, 5, 6 and 7 we show
the model of the case-study. We follow the methodology
of refinement and we introduce respectively: the goal of
the system, the details of the system without time, the
real-time properties of the signals passing and the real-
time properties of the sleeping times. In Section 8, we
show the verification of the model. Finally in Section 9,
we show related-work and we conclude.
2 Overview of event-B development by
step-wise refinement
2.1 Event-based modelling
This event-driven approach [2] is based on the B nota-
tion. It extends the methodological scope of basic con-
cepts in order to take into account the idea of formal
models. Roughly speaking, a formal model is charac-
terised by a (finite) list x of state variables possibly
modified by a (finite) list of events; an invariant I(x)
states properties that must always be satisfied by the
variables x and maintained by the activation of the
events. In the following, we briefly recall definitions and
principles of formal models and explain how they can
be managed by tools [3,9].
Generalised substitutions are borrowed from the B
notation. They provide a means for expressing changes
to state variable values. In its simple form, x := E(x), a
generalised substitution looks like an assignment state-
ment. In this construct, x denotes a vector built on the
set of state variables of the model, and E(x) a vec-
tor of expressions. However, the interpretation we shall
give here to this statement is not that of an assignment
statement. We interpret it as a logical simultaneous sub-
stitution of each variable of the vector x by the corre-
sponding expression of the vector E(x). There exists
a more general normal form, denoted by the construct
x : |P (x, x′). This should be read: “x is modified in
such a way that the predicate P (x, x′) holds”, where x′
denotes the new value of the vector and x denotes its
old value. This is clearly non-deterministic in general.
An event has two main parts: a guard, which is a
predicate built on the state variables, and an action,
which is a generalised substitution. An event can take
one of the three normal forms. The first form (evnt =̂
begin x : |P (x, x′) end) represents an event that
is not guarded: it is thus always enabled and is se-
mantically defined by P (x, x′). The second (evt =̂
when G(x) then x : Q(x, x′) end) and third (evt =̂
any t where G(t, x) then x : R(x, x′, t) end)
forms are guarded by a guard which states the neces-
sary condition for these events to occur. Such a guard is
represented by WHEN G(x) in the second form, and by
ANY t HERE G(t, x) (for ∃ t · G(t, x) ) in the third form.
We note that the third form defines a possibly non-
deterministic event where t represents a vector of dis-
tinct local variables. The, so-called, before-after predi-
cate BA(x, x′) associated with each of the three event
types, describes the event as a logical predicate express-
ing the relationship linking the values of the state vari-
ables just before (x) and just after (x′) the “execution”
of event evt.
Proof obligations are produced from events in order
to state that an invariant condition I(x) is preserved.
Their general form follows immediately from the defi-
nition of the before-after predicate, BA(x, x′), of each
event:
I(x) ∧ BA(x, x′) ⇒ I(x′)
Note that it follows from the two guarded forms of
the events that this obligation is trivially discharged
when the guard of the event is false.
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2.2 Model Refinement
The refinement of a formal model allows us to enrich
a model in a step-by-step approach, and is the foun-
dation of our correct-by-construction approach. Refine-
ment provides a way to strengthen invariants and to
add details to a model. It is also used to transform an
abstract model into a more concrete version by modify-
ing the state description. This is done by extending the
list of state variables, by refining each abstract event
into a corresponding concrete version, and by adding
new events. The abstract state variables, x, and the
concrete ones, y, are linked together by means of a, so-
called, gluing invariant J(x, y). A number of proof obli-
gations ensure that (1) each abstract event is correctly
refined by its corresponding concrete version, (2) each
new event refines skip, (3) no new event takes control
for ever, and (4) relative deadlock-freeness is preserved.
Details of the formulation of these proofs follows.
We suppose that an abstract model AM with vari-
ables x and invariant I(x) is refined by a concrete model
CM with variables y and gluing invariant J(x, y). If
BAA(x, x′) and BAC(y, y′) are respectively the ab-
stract and concrete before-after predicates of the same
event, we have to prove the following statement, corre-
sponding to proof obligation (1):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ BAC(y, y′)
⇒ ∃x′ · (BAA(x, x′) ∧ J(x′, y′))
Now, proof obligation (2) states that BA(y, y′) must
refine skip (x′ = x), generating the following simple
statement to prove (2):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ BA(y, y′) ⇒ J(x, y′)
For the third proof obligation, we formalise the no-
tion of the system advancing in its execution; a stan-
dard technique is to introduce a variant V (y) that is
decreased by each new event (to guarantee that an ab-
stract step may occur). This leads to the following state-
ment to prove (3):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ BA(y, y′) ⇒ V (y′) < V (y)
Finally, to prove that the concrete model does not
introduce additional deadlocks, we give formalisms for
reasoning about the event guards in the concrete and
abstract models: grds(AM) represents the disjunction
of the guards of the events of the abstract model, and
grds(CM) represents the disjunction of the guards of
the events of the concrete model. Relative deadlock
freeness is now easily formalised as the following proof
obligation (4):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ grds(AM) ⇒ grds(CM)
To review, refinement guarantees that the set of
traces of the refined model contains (modulo stutter-
ing) the traces of the resulting model.
3 Real-time modelling in Event-B
The formal method Event-B is untimed, we proposed
in [8] extending it in order to model time with a pat-
tern. For the sake of completeness we recall some con-
tent from [8] in a updated form and we show how this
generic pattern is used in this case study. This pattern
shows generic forms for event suited to express the dif-
ferent aspect of real-time. We call it a pattern because
it represents a general domain or aspect (like real-time
properties or constraints) and not a particular proper-
ties of a system. Thus we argue that pattern can be
re-use in several systems study of the same domain.
We use the variables now in N to represent the current
time, hence we use a discrete time. And the variable
at (stands for Activation Times) is a function from a
set labels of real-time activity labels to a subset of N: :
at ∈ labels → P(N). This fonction at is used to give for
every label in dom(at), a set of activation times in the
future, like in a calendar. Therefore, we have in invari-
ant:
∀e·(e ∈ evts ∧ at(e) 6= ∅ ⇒ now ≤ min(at(e)))
We now give the pattern which shows how to write
an event-B model of a real-time system. To do that
each event of the new model will refine one (or maybe
several) event(s) of the pattern. The resulting events
will inherit the real-time properties of the pattern.
Let is start by the initialisation:
initialisation =̂
BEGIN
act1: now := 0
act2: at :∈ labels → P(N)
END
The current time now is set to zero and at can be set
to any total fonction from labels to P(N). In practice,
in this case study, at will be set to {l 7→ ∅|l ∈ labels}.
The event add shows how to add a new future ac-
tivation time ntime for the activity e:
add =̂
ANY
e
ntime
WHERE
grd1: e ∈ dom(at)
grd2: now < ntime
THEN
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act1: at(e) := at(e) ∪ {ntime}
END
In the event use the activity e is activated, at the
current time now, but only if this activation has been
planned in the set at(e) (now ∈ at(e)); in this case we
remove the current time from at(e).
use =̂
ANY
e
WHERE
grd1: e ∈ dom(at)
grd2: now ∈ at(e)
THEN
act1: at(e) := at(e) \ {now}
END
Finally the event tick represents the time progres-
sion, we increase the current time at least to now + 1
and at most to the smallest time of the calendar (if
any).
tick =̂
ANY
n now
WHERE
grd1: now < n now
grd2: ∀e·e ∈ dom(at) ∧ at(e) 6= ∅
⇒n now ≤ min(at(e))
THEN
act1: now := n now
END
This initialisation and the three events add, use,
and tick are in a general form and now we can refine
them for the case study. We need two activities pass
and awake for two devices a and b. Hence we choose
for the set labels:
labels =



a pass,
b pass,
a awake,
b awake



In the next sections we develop step by step the fi-
nal model of the system. Each steps will be a refine-
ment between two models. First we introduce the un-
timed aspect of the system: the basic specification and
the components like channel. This leads to create (un-
timed) events and secondly we introduce the real-time
constraints over those events. Each events which adds
a real-time delay for another event will use the pat-
tern events add. And each events which happen when
the delay is exhausted will use the pattern events use.
Finally tick is added as it is to the model.
One last remark to conclude: instead of using di-
rectly the function at we can use the four labels as
subset of N, for example for the label a pass instead
of at(a pass) we use at a pass (with at a pass ∈ N). In
the following we call those sets “Activation Time” (AT)
because that is equivalent and sets are more friendly in
this set-based language.
4 First Model
This first model is the most abstract specification of our
system. The general behaviour is to choose (elect) one
device in the set N = {a, b}. The only variable leader
is a subset of N and contains the chosen device (if not
empty). Apart from this, the invariant states that the
set leader is {a} or {b} or ∅. In the initialisation of
the system the variable leader is set to ∅ (because no
leader is elected).
Finally the transitions of this abstract system are
given by the event accept:
accept =̂
ANY x WHERE
x ∈ N ∧
leader = ∅
THEN
leader := {x}
END
This event occurs when the set leader is empty and
fills it with a device. After this transitions the guard
of accept is false so no more transitions are possible.
All of the following models in the paper will refine this
behaviour.
5 First Refinement
We now introduce, through refinement, the local state
of devices and two communication channels between de-
vice a and b. Almost all behaviour of the system can
already be expressed abstractly at this level of abstrac-
tion. Communication will be asynchronous. In other
words a signal from a to b can cross a signal from b
to a. So the system can progress in two ways: if only
one signal is sent, a leader will be elected; if two sig-
nals cross, a situation called “contention” will appear.
In this situation the election is impossible, so the two
devices will remove their signals. After a contention the
devices wait for a random length of time before retrying
the election process. We note that real-time properties
will be added later and that model is a specification for
the future real-time properties. For example, we will
add a precise propagation time for the signal progress
in a channel.
Devices communicate with two SIGNALS: IDL
and PN . IDL is the initial and idle signal. PN (for
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Fig. 1 Devices and channels of the system
Parent Notify) means that the sender does not want to
be the leader. We have four different STATES for the
two devices a and b, devices are in the state: reset when
they start; sending when they are sending the signal
PN ; sleeping when they wait after a contention; and
accepting when they accept to be the leader. In the re-
finement, the variable leader disappears through data
refinement and we add nine new variables: variables
a state and b state for devices and three variables for
each channels a in, ab, b out and b in, ba, a out. (The
names of variables are chosen with the intuition that
the signal go into the channel, not outside the devices).
We need three variables for a channel because we want
asynchronous communication and we can have a max-
imum of two changes of signals at the same time. The
three variables of a channel act in a “first in first out”
way and we have an event to make the values progress
inside the channel from the input to the output. Finally,
the variable case does not take place in the behaviour
of the system but is used to denote a special case in
the invariant. We can see a graphical representation in
Fig. 1, which shows the very first sending of the signal
PN .
5.1 Invariant
The first point to specify in an invariant is the type
of the new variables: all variables of the channels are
members of the set SIGNALS; Variables a state and
b state are in STATES; and case is a boolean.
In this refinement the variable leader is not required
anymore because we can deduce the leader of the elec-
tion from the state of the devices. So we can replace
the abstract variable leader by the concrete variables
a state and b state. We call this a “data refinement”.
For this we need a “gluing invariant” that relates the
value of the abstract variable with the value of the con-
crete variables. Here we want (leader = {a}⇔a state =
accepting) and the same thing for b. We also know
that if the PN signal is present in both channels then
leader = ∅. Furthermore, if one device is accepting
then the other is sending (the signal PN) and all sig-
nals have been received. (For device a: leader = {a} ⇒
a state = accepting ∧ b state = sending ∧ ab = IDL ∧
b out = IDL ∧ ba = PN ∧ a out = PN.)
This part of the invariant is the most important,
but there are more things to express. First of all, in
the initial state of the system devices are reset. With
that condition all variables of the channel from this
device are equal to IDL, for device a: a state = re-
set ⇒ (a in = IDL ∧ b out = IDL ∧ ab = IDL). We
also know that if a device is reset the other one is ei-
ther reset or sending. When a device, for instance a,
is sending then the beginning of the channel is set to
PN , for instance a in = PN . We have the equiva-
lence: (a state = sending ⇔ a in = PN). We are also
sure that if a device is reset and this device receives
the PN signal then the other must be sending. In this
case, the receiving device can safely accept to be the
leader. Consider the case where the receiving device is
also in the state sending: the election is now impossible
and we are in a situation of “contention”. The device
discovers this situation and sets its state to sleeping.
In this state we have for device a: a in = IDL and
b state ∈ {sending, sleeping} (and the symmetric case
for b: b state = sleeping ⇒ b in = IDL ∧ b state ∈
{sending, sleeping}). So the signal PN will be erased by
IDL. After this, each device will go back to the sending
state and the previous part of the invariant is used to
describe the state. The level of modelling is quite ab-
stract and we will see in the final refinement many more
(real-time) statements over states, especially in the sit-
uation of contention.
Next, we express a simplification in the use of the
channels: if we will have only one change of signal pro-
gressing in a channel we can directly put the progres-
sion at the final step. Because it is only important for
the environment, the devices do not have anything spe-
cial to do. For example, for the channel from a to b
we can have: (a in = ab ∧ ab = b out) or (a in =
ab ∧ ab 6= b out) or (a in 6= ab ∧ ab 6= b out) but
not (a in 6= ab ∧ ab = b out). Therefore we add: if
a state = sending then ab = PN , and the same for
b.
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Fig. 2 Transitions of the two devices
Finally the case boolean variable is true if and only
if: one of devices is sending and the other is sleeping:
case = TRUE ⇒ (a state = sending ∧ b state = sleep-
ing) ∨ (b state = sending ∧ a state = sleeping); and
the device currently sending was previously in the state
sleeping: property ensure by the events.
The variable case expresses this with relations be-
tween values of case and values of other variables. This
is the key to the algorithm because when a device goes
back to the state sending after sleeping, it can elect a
leader if the duration of this case is long enough. We
will see the utility of case in the last refinement. In
other words, if the second device awakes a long time
after the first: then the first device has enough time to
send their signal. Otherwise, the contention reappears.
5.2 Events
Events give properties over the transitions of the sys-
tem. We can see on the Fig. 2 the transition graph of
devices, transitions about the progression of message
over channel variables are not represented. Here we have
four kinds of events: send, pass, accept and sleep. From
now on we will describe the model only from the point
of view of the device a. As the system is totally sym-
metric between devices a and b, the reader can easily
fill in the blanks.
init =̂
BEGIN
a in, b in, a out, b out, ab, ba :=
IDL, IDL, IDL, IDL, IDL, IDL‖
a state, b state := reset, reset‖
case := FALSE
END;
a send =̂
WHEN
a state = reset∧
a out = IDL
THEN
a state := sending‖
a in := PN‖
ab := PN
END;
b send =̂ . . .
ab pass out =̂
WHEN
ab 6= b out∧
(b state 6= sending ∨ b out 6= PN)
THEN
b out := ab‖
ab := a in
END;
ba pass out =̂ . . .
pass out =̂
WHEN
ab 6= b out∧
ba 6= a out
THEN
b out := ab‖
ab := a in‖
a out := ba‖
ba := b in
END;
a accept =̂
REFINES accept WHEN
a state = reset∧
a out = PN
THEN
a state := accepting
END;
b accept =̂ . . .
a sleep =̂
ANY new ab WHERE
a state = sending∧
a out = PN∧
new ab ∈ SIGNALS∧
(ab = b out ⇒ new ab = IDL)∧
(ab 6= b out ⇒ new ab = PN)
THEN
a state := sleeping‖
a in := IDL‖
ab := new ab
END;
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b sleep =̂ . . .
a awake send =̂
WHEN
a state = sleeping∧
a out = IDL∧
ab = IDL∧
b out = IDL
THEN
a state := sending‖
a in := PN‖
ab := PN‖
case := ¬case
END;
b awake send =̂ . . .
a awake accept =̂
REFINES accept WHEN
a state = sleeping∧
a out = PN∧
b state = sending∧
ab = IDL∧
b out = IDL
THEN
a state := accepting‖
case := ¬case
END;
b awake accept =̂ . . .
As written with the keyword “REFINES”, four ev-
ents refine the abstract event accept. : a accept, b accept,
a awake accept and b awake accept.
The guard of the event a send express that a has
never sent anything and is not receiving a signal. With
this condition we send a signal to the device b. The
substitution: ab := PN comes with a simplification in
the use of the channel.
The ab pass event shows how a signal progresses
in the channel from a to b. We know that (a in 6=
ab ⇒ ab 6= b out). Therefore when there is at least one
change of signal in the channel we know that ab 6= b out.
Then we advance values from a in to ab and from ab
to b out. However, when there are changes of signals
in both channels we can make the values pass in both
channels at the same time. This is done by the event
pass out. Without this event, in this abstract model,
one channel can take priority over the other, for exam-
ple with several activations of ab pass out without ac-
tivations of ba pass out. This is not realistic behaviour,
but in model with real-time properties this problem
is solved. In the last line of the guard of ab pass out
we can see an expression of the priority of the event
b sleep. To express priority, we take the guard (or a
crucial part of the guard) of the event with the higher
priority and put its negation in the guard of the event
with the lower priority. A part of the guard is crucial
if it negation is enought to prevent the execution of
the event in any case. Hence both events can not trig-
ger in the same state. Without this priority the system
could execute the sequence: a send, b send, pass out,
a sleep, ab pass, a accept. However, such a sequence is
not allowed by the standard as a device has to have dis-
covered the contention situation. In this sequence the
device b failed to discover it (i.e. to execute b sleep). In
this refinement the problem is solved abstractly and in
later models we will use real-time constraints.
The event a accept triggers when the situation of
contention never occurred (impossible when a state is
still reset) and a device receives a signal PN .
In contrast, a device can discover a situation of con-
tention when it is sending and it has received a sig-
nal PN . In this case it goes to sleep and starts to re-
move its signal PN . This is the only state where we
can have two changes of signal in the same channel. It’s
achieved when we already have ab 6= b out. Therefore
the new state of the channel will be (a in = IDL∧ab =
PN ∧ b out = IDL).
Finally, there are two events left: a awake send and
a awake accept. They contain the same behaviour as
a send and a accept plus the management of the vari-
able case and some extra conditions.
In addition to the guard of a send, the event a awa-
ke send must check that the previous signal PN of de-
vice a is erased from the channel from a to b. This can be
seen in the last two lines of the guard of a awake send.
In addition to the guard of a accept, the event a awa-
ke accept must check that the signal is erased in the
same way. It has also to check if the device b is actually
in the sending state. This is done by the third line of
the guard. Otherwise one device would accept to be the
leader with the other device in state sleeping because
a out = PN does not imply that b state = sending;
and it would lead to an incorrect election situation.
In conclusion, this model is enough to express all
safety properties abstractly and now we can introduce
the real-time.
6 Second Refinement
In this second refinement, we add a precise propagation
time for the propagation of a signal inside a channel.
This constant, called prop, is in N and is not equal to
zero. We can see on the Fig. 3 an example timeline of
a communication, each event activations are indicated
with the name of the event. This model contains three
new variables: time, at a pass and at b pass. The vari-
able time is a global clock, the value of time represents
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Fig. 3 Timeline of the system with prop = 3
“now” the current time. The algorithm itself does not
require a global clock or a synchronisation between de-
vices. But in the B method we need closed systems, i.e.
we need to model the environment. Time is a part of
the environment of our devices and it plays a central
role in the invariant. The two other variables are two
sets of “Activation Time” (AT) i.e. a set of timeouts or
alarms. Each AT set is linked to some particular event.
Here the set at a pass (respectively at b pass ) is linked
to ab pass out (ba pass out). Therefore, they are both
linked to pass out. The meaning is: the AT set con-
tains the time in the future when the linked event will
be triggered. Of course, other events can fill the AT set
of another event. In a very natural way, we let the time
progress in a non-deterministic way betwen time+1 and
the first AT. If there is no AT then time progression is
not limited. When time reaches an activation time, the
linked event can be triggered and we remove the AT
from the set in the related event. With this model, we
are sure that time is progressing, and every time con-
straint events linked to a AT set will also be triggered
at the right moment. This model of time has already
been described in our article [8].
6.1 Invariant
The typing of the new variables are (time ∈ N) and
(at a pass ⊆ N) and (at b pass ⊆ N). We use a dis-
crete time. As the system is symmetric we only show
invariants concerning the device a. The time can not
go beyond an activation time, as we don’t want to miss
the timeout of an event:
at a pass ∪ at b pass 6= ∅
⇒time ≤ min(at a pass ∪ at b pass)
As at a pass represents the time of the reception of
a signal, and signals take the propagation time prop to
progress in the channel, then this AT set is bound by
time + prop:
∀x·(x ∈ at a pass ⇒ x ≤ time + prop)
The set at a pass is finite and its cardinality reflects
the number of signal changes travelling in the channel.
In the computer model we use a formula with quantifi-
cation instead of a cardinality because it is more con-
venient for the interactive proof.
b in = ba ∧ ba = a out ⇔ at a pass = ∅
a in = ab ∧ ab 6= b out ⇔ card(at a pass) = 1
b in 6= ba ∧ ba 6= a out ⇔ card(at a pass) = 2
A device can not start to send after the reception of
a signal PN so we have:
∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a pass ∧ y ∈ at b pass
⇒|x − y| < prop
)
If cardinality of at b pass is two, then the difference
of members are strictly under prop because they are
both bound by time+prop and because the pass events
have higher priority than sleep events.
∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at b pass ∧ y ∈ at b pass
⇒|x − y| < prop
)
The time continues to progress after a sending and
if contention is reached we have:
b in = PN ∧ b out = PN
⇒time + prop /∈ at a pass
The events pass have higher priority than the events
send:
time ∈ at a pass ∪ at b pass
⇒time + prop /∈ at a pass ∪ at b pass
This part allows us to prove the refinement of the
event ab pass out:
ab6=b out ∧ time ∈ at b pass − at a pass
⇒b state6=sending ∨ b out = IDL
6.2 Events
In this refinement we have a new event tick. This event
makes the time progress. In almost all guards, we add
an extra clause to model the priority between events.
The main reason for the use of priorities is the fact
that the environment must act before the devices re-
act. Otherwise, the behaviour is not always consistent.
Here, the environment is the three pass events, so we
add time /∈ (at a pass ∪ at b pass) in guards to let
pass events trigger before the other. Of course, between
the three pass events, the simultaneous passing event
pass out has higher priority. Finally, the real-time con-
straints model the propagation time of signals. In the
next description of events, we show only the differences
between events of the previous refinement. For that we
mark new lines with a ⊕ and removed lines with a ⊖.
All new lines of guards are connected with “∧” and lines
of substitution with “‖”.
init =̂
BEGIN
⊕time := 0
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⊕at a pass, at b pass := ∅, ∅
END;
a send =̂
WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at a pass ∪ at b pass)
THEN
⊕at b pass := at b pass ∪ {time + prop}
END;
b send =̂ . . .
ab pass out =̂
WHEN
⊖(b state 6= sending ∨ b out 6= PN)
⊕time ∈ at b pass − at a pass
THEN
⊕at b pass := at b pass − {time}
END;
ba pass out =̂ . . .
pass out =̂
WHEN
⊕time ∈ at a pass ∩ at b pass
THEN
⊕at a pass := at a pass − {time}
⊕at b pass := at b pass − {time}
END;
a accept =̂
WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at a pass ∪ at b pass)
THEN
. . .
END;
b accept =̂ . . .
a sleep =̂
WHERE
⊕time /∈ (at a pass ∪ at b pass)
THEN
⊕at b pass := at b pass ∪ {time + prop}
END;
b sleep =̂ . . .
a awake send =̂
WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at a pass ∪ at b pass)
THEN
⊕at b pass := at b pass ∪ {time + prop}
END;
b awake send =̂ . . .
a awake accept =̂
WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at a pass ∪ at b pass)∧
THEN
. . .
END;
b awake accept =̂ . . .
tick =̂
ANY tm WHERE
tm ∈ N∧
tm > time∧
((at a pass ∪ at b pass) 6= ∅
⇒tm ≤ min(at a pass ∪ at b pass))∧
(a state 6= sending ∨ a out 6= PN)∧
(b state 6= sending ∨ b out 6= PN)
THEN
time := tm
END;
7 Third Refinement
This final refinement removes all abstract conditions in
the guards and adds the two different sleep times. As we
have already explained devices try to go out of the sit-
uation of contention by waiting a random time between
a short and a long time. So we have two new constants
st (short time) and lt (long time) both in N and non-
zero. Their values have the two following properties:
st ≥ prop × 2 and lt ≥ prop × 2 + st − 1. Properties
are chosen in order to leave enough time for the de-
vices to react. The whole invariant of this paper is a
proof of that. In this refinement we have four new vari-
ables: at a awake, at b awake, a sleept, b sleept. Vari-
able at a awake (respectively at b awake) are a AT set
linked to the events a awake send and a awake accept
(b awake send and b awake accept). Variables a sleept
and b sleept contain the chosen sleep time. We can see
in the Fig. 4 a timeline showing a typical situation of
contention with values prop = 3, st = 6 and lt = 11.
The election will succeed if devices chose two different
delays between st and lt. In that case, we can see in the
Fig. 4 that the difference between the two awake times
of devices will be enough to transmit a signal. The in-
variant discussed in the following section will express
this formally.
7.1 Invariant
Both new AT sets at a awake and at b awake are a
subset of N. Values of variables a sleept and b sleept
are in {st, lt}. We have the same property as in the
previous invariant about time and values of AT set:
time can not go after the first timeout. The new AT
sets contain zero or one value:
a state 6= sleeping ⇔ at a awake = ∅
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Fig. 4 Timeline of the system with prop = 3, st = 6 and lt = 11
a state = sleeping ⇔ card(at a awake) = 1
We have a general upper bound for the new AT set
and a special case:
∀x·(x ∈ at a awake ⇒ x ≤ time + a sleept)
time ∈ at a awake ∧ a sleept = b sleept
⇒∀x·(x ∈ at b awake ⇒ x < time + prop)
And we have several kinds of lower bound with con-
ditions:
a in = PN ∧
(
a out = PN
∨(a out = IDL ∧ ba = PN)
)
⇒∀x·
(
x ∈ at b awake
⇒time + b sleept − prop < x
)
a in = PN ∧ a out = PN
⇒∀x·(x ∈ at b awake ⇒ time + prop < x)
case = FALSE ∧ b state = sending
⇒∀x·(x ∈ at a awake ⇒ time + prop < x)
time ∈ at a awake ∧ a sleept 6= b sleept
⇒∀x·(x ∈ at b awake ⇒ time + prop ≤ x)
This invariant restricts the possible values of
at a awake:
ab = PN∧b out = IDL⇒time+prop /∈ at a awake
Here we can see that, in two different cases, the
signal is received before awake time:
case = FALSE
⇒∀(x, y)·
(
(x ∈ at a pass ∧ y ∈ at a awake
⇒x < y)
)
a sleept 6= b sleept
⇒∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a pass ∧ y ∈ at a awake
⇒x ≤ y
)
In the following conditions the awake time is before
signal reception:
case = TRUE ∧ a sleept = b sleept
⇒∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a awake ∧ y ∈ at a pass
⇒x < y
)
After the discovering of the contention, device a
erases its signal at a propagation time before awake
time:
∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a pass ∧ y ∈ at b awake
⇒x + prop ≤ y
)
If chosen delays are equal, then devices do not have
the time to transmit a signal:
a sleept = b sleept
⇒∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a awake ∧ y ∈ at b awake
⇒|x − y| < prop
)
If chosen delays are different, then devices have the
time to transmit a signal. This formula shows why this
algorithm works when chosen delays are different.
a sleept 6= b sleept
⇒∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a awake ∧ y ∈ at b awake
⇒prop ≤ |x − y|
)
If the cardinality of at a pass is two then we have
b sleept − prop between awake time and the reception
time of the first signal.
b in 6= ba ∧ ba 6= a out
⇒∀x·


x ∈ at b awake
⇒min(at a pass)+
b sleept − prop < x


Finally, these formulae ensure the refinement of events
a awake send and a awake accept:
time ∈ at a awake
⇒ab = IDL ∧ b out = IDL
time ∈ at a awake ∧ (a out = PN ∨ ba = PN)
⇒b state = sending
case = FALSE ∧ time ∈ at a awake
⇒b state = sleeping
7.2 Events
Again we show only the difference, we mark new lines
with a ⊕ and removed lines with a ⊖. If an event is
not present then it does not have any differences or it
is symmetric.
With the real-time properties of awake events we
can remove all abstract conditions in guard of these
events. The properties, expressed with the new AT sets,
ensure this requirement as we can see in the last part
of the invariant.
init =̂
BEGIN
⊕at a awake, at b awake := ∅, ∅
⊕a sleept, b sleept := st, st
END;
a sleep =̂
ANY ⊕sleep
WHERE ⊕sleep ∈ {st, lt}
THEN ⊕at a awake :=
at a awake ∪ {time + sleep}
⊕a sleept := sleep
END;
b sleep =̂ . . .
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a awake send =̂
WHEN
⊕time ∈ at a awake
⊖a state = sleeping
⊖ab = IDL
⊖b outs = IDL
THEN
⊕at a awake := at a awake − {time}
END;
b awake send =̂ . . .
a awake accept =̂
WHEN
⊕time ∈ at a awake
⊖a state = sleeping
⊖b state = sending
⊖ab = IDL
⊖b out = IDL
THEN
⊕at a awake := at a awake − {time}
END;
b awake accept =̂ . . .
tick =̂ . . .
ANY
tm
WHERE
tm ∈ N ∧
tm > time ∧

(
at a pass ∪ at a awake∪
at b pass ∪ at b awake
)
6= ∅
⇒tm ≤ min


at a pass∪
at a awake∪
at b pass∪
at b awake




∧
(a state 6= sending ∨ a out 6= PN) ∧
(b state 6= sending ∨ b out 6= PN)
THEN
time := tm
END
8 Verification by Proof and Model-checking
For us, the primary way of verification is done by me-
chanical proof. But we also have used model-checking
with ProB ([13]) in order to make partial verifications
and to find counter-examples. In order to have a fi-
nite number of transitions with our models, we can not
let the variable time increase indefinitely. Therefore,
we define another version for the event tick for model-
checking. This version of the event tick lets the variable
time always be zero but decreases the values inside the
prop reachable states
1 25
2 51
3 81
4 117
5 159
6 207
Fig. 5 Number of reachable states: m2
prop st lt reachable states
1 2 3 54
2 4 7 186
3 6 11 376
4 8 15 624
5 10 19 930
6 12 23 1294
Fig. 6 Number of reachable states: m3
AT sets. For instance, the tick event from the second
refinement becomes:
tick =̂
ANY shift WHERE
shift ∈ N∧
0 < shift∧(
(at a pass ∪ at b pass) 6= ∅
⇒shift ≤ min(at a pass ∪ at b pass)
)
∧
(a state 6= sending ∨ a out 6= PN)∧
(b state 6= sending ∨ b out 6= PN)
THEN
at a pass := { x| x+shift∈ at a pass}
at b pass := { x| x+shift∈ at b pass}
END;
With ProB it is not possible to do parametric model-
checking, therefore we need to give a value (which ver-
ifies all hypotheses) to prop, st, and lt. With the new
tick and those valuations, the number of transitions of
the system is finite
Therefore we were able to check all models (invari-
ant included) with ProB. Fig 5 and 6 give the reachable
number of states for the second refinement model m2
and the third refinement m3, and the used valuation of
constants. The first model and first refinement are triv-
ially checked with 4 states and 24 states respectively.
But as time always equals zero and constants are
valued, an invariant, determined to be correct with the
model-checker, will not always be correct for the proof.
In any case, model-checking provides a convenient way
to discover invariants and to test them before the proof.
With the B tool the proof is cut into small “Proof
Obligations” (PO). Some of those PO are automatically
discharged and some need user interactions. All proofs
of the first model are done automatically; for the first
refinement 59 PO are interactive; for the second refine-
ment 124; and for the last refinement 222. Of course
all the proofs are done with the tool of the B method.
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The first refinement is very easy to prove, the proofs of
second and third refinement are short but numerous.
As the model is symmetric between the two devices
a and b, there are two similar versions of each event and
of each invariant. Therefore the proof is also symmetric.
For instance: the invariant (a state = sending⇔a in =
PN) need to be verified for the events send a and
send b and again for the invariant (b state = sending⇔
b in = PN) with send a and send b. Thus we have 4
proofs which may be very repetitive or totally symmet-
ric. All versions are taken into consideration inside the
number of PO.
The procedure of proof, with an invariant, leads to
the discovery of an invariant strong enough to be in-
ductive. We can always start with a small invariant
containing types of variables and some requirements for
the refinements of data or events. If we start to do the
proof with an invariant that is too weak then the proof
will fail with an impossible interactive proof. With this
failure we see the missing piece of information about
the system state: we add it to the invariant and retry
to prove.
In the case of real-time systems, we can split PO in
two parts: PO coming from the event tick; and PO com-
ing from all other events. The first kind of PO requires
the invariant to be inductive with the progression of the
time. Every invariant which contains the time variable
now are non-trivial to prove for the event tick because
this event increments now. The second requires the in-
variant to be inductive with the transitions of devices
states, as usual for B models. This leads to different
kinds of proof and different constraints over the invari-
ant but the two invariants are dependant. Thanks to
the encoding of the time properties in the language of
the B method, the proof was done with the normal tools
and ways of the B method.
9 Related-works and Conclusion
Many of other works about IEEE Root Contention Pro-
tocol (RCP) use model-checking over timed automata
[6]. We can find a comparative study of works about
RCP in [14], this work extends thoses results by an-
other approach. Our approach of verification is primary
focused on proof by invariant. It’s clear that an interac-
tive proof takes more time than verification by model-
checker or proof with decision procedures. This is the
price to pay for an expressive general language based
on set theory. But the tool cuts the verification proof in
small and quite easy parts. And we plan to work on the
rules of the tool in order to reduce the number of inter-
active steps, as the proofs show a repetitive scheme a lot
of improvements can be done. The idea of using a vari-
able to model the time is shown in [1], authors call this:
explicit-time specification. Here the model of time (AT
sets) is different. They focus on worst-case upper and
lower bounds on real-time delays. An absolute timer,
which can be a lower-bound or a upper-bound, imposes
timing bound on actions. A volatile δ-timer counts how
much time an action has been continuously enabled.
A persistent δ-timer is the same as a volatile δ-timer
without the continuous condition over the activation.
For the (classical) B method (which is the “parent”
of the Event-B method used here) an extension using
duration calculus is described in the thesis [10] and in
the article [11]. Our work here is different because clas-
sical B principally uses operations, which take a certain
amount of time to run, whereas an event is an instanta-
neous action. This work can be link to the time aware
system refinement for Action Systems in [15] where ac-
tions also take a certain time.
Similarly to our pattern, Dutertre and Sorea in [12]
model and verify an explicit-time specification of a dis-
tributed algorithm of election, where timing constraints
are modeled as a timeout and calendar. The calendar
gives the future times of execution of some events, and
this notion is close to our pattern for Event-B in [8]. But
the authors do not use a non-deterministic “tick” event
which makes the time progress. Instead the time goes
directly from one event activation to the next event acti-
vation. This model prevent the use of clocks which vary
continuously and this allows authors to use a symbolic
model-checker. In our work, we use mainly a verifica-
tion by theorem proving and thus our pattern does not
need this particular time progression.
Another work can be found in [7] where authors ex-
tend the Abstract State Machines method with First
Order Timed Logic in order to verify the Root Con-
tention Protocol with a specific decision procedure. In
this paper we use a general tool to reason about a spe-
cific domain. In fact, in many cases real-time systems
arise in specialised areas like distributed computing, for
this reason it is a interesting work to study how to ex-
tend an existing specification with specific properties
like real-time properties.
The work presented in this paper starts with this
situation: we can see in [5] a distributed election algo-
rithm, where most of the problem studied does not re-
quire time to be taken into account. But the final phase
of this algorithm uses timing constraints, so we found
it useful to find a practical way to verify those tim-
ing aspects using the same formal method: the Event-B
method.
With our pattern, one can model a real-time system
within the B method. The refinement relation between
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models can be used in order to introduce time in a
model and can be used again to add real-time proper-
ties step by step. If a concrete model with time refines
an abstract model we can prove the timing validity of
the concrete model. At every step of refinement, we can
verify the model and its invariants by model-checking
it first and then by a computer-assisted proof. This pa-
per shows how our pattern of refinement of real-time
constraints works on the IEEE 1394 RCP. The safety
proof of RCP is done and we can see from the last in-
variant how the election works when chosen delays are
different:
If chosen delays are different (a sleept 6= b sleept),
then devices have the time to transmit a signal:
∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a awake ∧ y ∈ at b awake
⇒prop ≤ |x − y|)
)
But if chosen delays are equal (a sleept = b sleept),
then devices do not have enough time:
∀(x, y)·
(
x ∈ at a awake ∧ y ∈ at b awake
⇒|x − y| < prop)
)
Where at a awake and at b awake are sets of nat-
ural and represent the time when devices will stop to
wait. And prop is the propagation time needed by the
signal to pass from one device to another. Notice when
devices are not in the state sleeping and do not plan
to awake then the corresponding set is empty.
Our method can be used without changes to the lan-
guage of B and therefore we can extend existing results
and developments in B with real-time. As the proofs
about passing of time are specific, we could consider a
way of handling this specificity. Our time is discrete but
in our proof the most important property used is the or-
der over natural numbers. The time model used involves
a global time which interacts with a number of time of
activation stored in several sets as in a global multi-set.
As the studied algorithm does not require synchronisa-
tion, the global time is not a problem but we can think
about localising this into several distributed clocks for
other case-studies.
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8. Cansell, D., Mèry, D., Rehm, J.: Time constraint patterns
for event B development. In: B 2007: Formal Specification
and Development in B, vol. 4355/2006, pp. 140–154. Springer
(2007)
9. ClearSy, Aix-en-Provence (F): B4FREE (2004).
Http://www.b4free.com
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